

- DECISION -

Claimant:
TAMARA C PIERCE

Decision No.: 3661-BR-13

Date: September 25, 2013

Appeal No.: 1315997

S.S. No.:

Employer:
GOOD N CLEAN LLC
2710

L.O. No.: 63

Appellant: Employer

Issue: Whether the claimant was discharged for misconduct or gross misconduct connected with the work within the meaning of Maryland Code, Labor and Employment Article, Title 8, Section 8-1002 or 1003.

- NOTICE OF RIGHT OF APPEAL TO COURT -

You may file an appeal from this decision in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City or one of the Circuit Courts in a county in Maryland. The court rules about how to file the appeal can be found in many public libraries, in the Maryland Rules of Procedure, Title 7, Chapter 200.

The period for filing an appeal expires: October 25, 2013

REVIEW OF THE RECORD

After a review of the record, the Board makes the following findings of fact and reverses the hearing examiner's decision.

The claimant was hired to work a permanent part time position as an office cleaner, earning \$9.50 per hour. The claimant was hired to work two nights a week, on Mondays and Wednesdays, cleaning a medical facility. The claimant was given a start time and her ending time would be when the work was completed. The employer sent the claimant a letter

summarizing this information on the same day as the interview and subsequent hire. Both parties agreed to the conditions of employment.

On the claimant's first day of work, the claimant's employer met the claimant on site and gave her a list of duties. Additionally, the employer also had another person working the site. The claimant worked until 10:00 p.m. that evening.

The next day, the employer called the claimant to see how the claimant's first evening on the job went, after the employer left the site. The claimant informed her employer that it was more work than she expected and the claimant wanted more money to perform the job. The employer informed the claimant that she could not pay her more at this time and that under the terms of her employment letter her work would be reviewed in sixty days. The claimant continued to assert that she would not work for \$9.50 an hour. The employer told her that she would not pay more and would find someone else to do the job.

The General Assembly declared that, in its considered judgment, the public good and the general welfare of the citizens of the State required the enactment of the Unemployment Insurance Law, under the police powers of the State, for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of individuals unemployed through no fault of their own. *Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. Art., § 8-102(c)*. Unemployment compensation laws are to be read liberally in favor of eligibility, and disqualification provisions are to be strictly construed. *Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore v. Dept. of Empl. & Training, 309 Md. 28 (1987)*.

The Board reviews the record *de novo* and may affirm, modify, or reverse the findings of fact or conclusions of law of the hearing examiner on the basis of evidence submitted to the hearing examiner, or evidence that the Board may direct to be taken, or may remand any case to a hearing examiner for purposes it may direct. *Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. Art., § 8-510(d)*; *COMAR 09.32.06.04*. The Board fully inquires into the facts of each particular case. *COMAR 09.32.06.03(E)(1)*.

A threshold issue in this case is whether the claimant voluntarily quit or whether the claimant was discharged. For the following reasons, the Board reverses the hearing examiner's decision on this issue. The claimant refused to work for the hourly salary that was agreed to by both parties. Therefore, the claimant was the moving party in the separation. Continuing work was available for the claimant.

The burden of proof in this case is allocated according to whether the claimant voluntarily quit or whether the employer discharged the claimant. In a discharge case, the employer has the burden of demonstrating that the claimant's actions rise to the level of misconduct, gross misconduct or aggravated misconduct based upon a preponderance of the credible evidence in the record. *Hartman v. Polystyrene Products Co., Inc., 164-BH-83*; *Ward v. Maryland Permalite, Inc., 30-BR-85*; *Weimer v. Dept. of Transportation, 869-BH-87*; *Scruggs v. Division of Correction, 347-BH-89*; *Ivey v. Catterton Printing Co., 441-BH-89*.

When a claimant voluntarily leaves work, he has the burden of proving that he left for good cause or valid circumstances based upon a preponderance of the credible evidence in the record. *Hargrove v. City of Baltimore, 2033-BH-83*; *Chisholm v. Johns Hopkins Hospital, 66-BR-89*. Purely personal reasons, no

matter how compelling, cannot constitute good cause as a matter of law. *Bd. Of Educ. Of Montgomery County v. Paynter*, 303 Md. 22 (1985). An objective standard is used to determine if the average employee would have left work in that situation; in addition, a determination is made as to whether a particular employee left in good faith, and an element of good faith is whether the claimant has exhausted all reasonable alternatives before leaving work. *Board of Educ. v. Paynter*, 303 Md. 22 (1985); also see *Bohrer v. Sheetz, Inc.*, Law No. 13361, (Cir. Ct. for Washington Co., Apr. 24, 1984). The “necessitous or compelling” requirement relating to a cause for leaving work voluntarily does not apply to “good cause”. *Board of Educ. v. Paynter*, 303 Md. 22 (1985). A resignation in lieu of discharge is a discharge under §§ 8-1002, 8-1002.1, and 8-1003. *Miller v. William T. Burnette and Company, Inc.*, 442-BR-82.

The intent to discharge or the intent to voluntarily quit can be manifested by words or actions. “Due to leaving work voluntarily” has a plain, definite and sensible meaning, free of ambiguity. It expresses a clear legislative intent that to disqualify a claimant from benefits, the evidence must establish that the claimant, by his or her own choice, intentionally and of his or her own free will, terminated the employment. *Allen v. Core Target Youth Program*, 275 Md. 69 (1975). A claimant’s intent or state of mind is a factual issue for the Board of Appeals to resolve. *Dept. of Econ. & Empl. Dev. v. Taylor*, 108 Md. 250(1996), *aff’d sub. nom.*, 344 Md. 687 (1997). An intent to quit one’s job can be manifested by actions as well as words. *Lawson v. Security Fence Supply Company*, 1101-BH-82. A resignation submitted in response to charges which *might* lead to discharge is a voluntary quit. *Hickman v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp.*, 973-BR-88; *Brewington v. Dept. of Social Services*, 1500-BH-82; *Roffe v. South Carolina Wateroe River Correction Institute*, 576-BR-88 (where a claimant quit because he feared a discharge was imminent, but he had not been informed that he was discharged is without good cause or valid circumstances); also see *Cofield v. Apex Grounds Management, Inc.*, 309-BR-91. When a claimant receives a medical leave of absence but is still believes she is unable to return upon the expiration of that leave and expresses that she will not return to work for an undefinable period, the claimant is held to have voluntarily quit. See *Sortino v. Western Auto Supply*, 896-BR-83.

The intent to discharge can be manifested by actions as well as words. The issue is whether the reasonable person in the position of the claimant believed in good faith that he was discharged. See *Dei Svaldi v. Martin Taubensfeld, D.D.S., P.A.*, 1074-BR-88 (the claimant was discharged after a telephone conversation during which she stated her anger at the employer and the employer stated to her, “If that’s the way you feel, then you might as well not come in anymore.” The claimant’s reply of “Fine” does not make it a quit). Compare, *Lawson v. Security Fence Supply Company*, 1101-BH-82. A quit in lieu of discharge is a discharge for unemployment insurance purposes. *Tressler v. Anchor Motor Freight*, 105-BR-83.

When a claimant voluntarily leaves work, she has the burden of proving that she left for good cause or valid circumstance. *Hargrove vs. City of Baltimore*, 2033-BH-83.

“Due to leaving work voluntarily” has a plain, definite and sensible meaning, free of ambiguity. It expresses a clear legislative intent that to disqualify a claimant from benefits, the evidence must establish that the claimant, by his or her own choice, intentionally and of his or her own free will, terminated the employment. *Allen v. Core Target Youth Program*, 275 Md. 69 (1975). A claimant’s intent or state of mind is a factual issue for the Board of Appeals to resolve. *Dept. of Econ. & Empl. Dev. v. Taylor*, 108

Md. App. 250, 274 (1996), aff'd sub. nom., 344 Md. 687 (1997). An intent to quit one's job can be manifested by actions as well as words. *Lawson v. Security Fence Supply Company, 1101-BH-82*. In a case where medical problems are at issue, mere compliance with the requirement of supplying a written statement or other documentary evidence of a health problem does not mandate an automatic award of benefits. *Shifflet v. Dept. of Emp. & Training, 75 Md. App. 282 (1988)*.

There are two categories of non-disqualifying reasons for quitting employment. When a claimant voluntarily leaves work, he has the burden of proving that he left for good cause or valid circumstances based upon a preponderance of the credible evidence in the record. *Hargrove v. City of Baltimore, 2033-BH-83; Chisholm v. Johns Hopkins Hospital, 66-BR-89*.

Quitting for "good cause" is the first non-disqualifying reason. *Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. Art., § 8-1001(b)*. Purely personal reasons, no matter how compelling, cannot constitute good cause as a matter of law. *Bd. Of Educ. Of Montgomery County v. Paynter, 303 Md. 22, 28 (1985)*. An objective standard is used to determine if the average employee would have left work in that situation; in addition, a determination is made as to whether a particular employee left in good faith, and an element of good faith is whether the claimant has exhausted all reasonable alternatives before leaving work. *Board of Educ. v. Paynter, 303 Md. 22, 29-30 (1985)*(requiring a "higher standard of proof" than for good cause because reason is not job related); also see *Bohrer v. Sheetz, Inc., Law No. 13361, (Cir. Ct. for Washington Co., Apr. 24, 1984)*. "Good cause" must be job-related and it must be a cause "which would reasonably impel the average, able-bodied, qualified worker to give up his or her employment." *Paynter, 303 Md. at 1193*. Using this definition, the Court of Appeals held that the Board correctly applied the "objective test": "The applicable standards are the standards of reasonableness applied to the average man or woman, and not to the supersensitive." *Paynter, 303 Md. at 1193*.

The second category or non-disqualifying reason is quitting for "valid circumstances". *Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. Art., § 8-1001(c)(1)*. There are two types of valid circumstances: a valid circumstance may be (1) a substantial cause that is job-related or (2) a factor that is non-job related but is "necessitous or compelling". *Paynter 202 Md. at 30*. The "necessitous or compelling" requirement relating to a cause for leaving work voluntarily does not apply to "good cause". *Board of Educ. v. Paynter, 303 Md. 22, 30 (1985)*. In a case where medical problems are at issue, mere compliance with the requirement of supplying a written statement or other documentary evidence of a health problem does not mandate an automatic award of benefits. *Shifflet v. Dept. of Emp. & Training, 75 Md. App. 282 (1988)*.

Section 8-1001 of the Labor and Employment Article provides that individuals shall be disqualified from the receipt of benefits where their unemployment is due to leaving work voluntarily, without good cause arising from or connected with the conditions of employment or actions of the employer or without, valid circumstances. A circumstance for voluntarily leaving work is valid if it is a substantial cause that is directly attributable to, arising from, or connected with the conditions of employment or actions of the employing unit or of such necessitous or compelling nature that the individual had no reasonable alternative other than leaving the employment.

The claimant continued to assert that she was terminated. The claimant, therefore, did not present any mitigating circumstances that would support a finding of good cause or valid circumstances for her

voluntary quit. The claimant would not continue her employment at the rate of pay to which both parties had agreed. There was work available for the claimant with this employer had the claimant not quit.


The Board notes that the hearing examiner did not offer or admit the *Agency Fact Finding Report* into evidence. The Board did not consider this document when rendering its decision.

The Board finds based on a preponderance of the credible evidence that the claimant did not meet her burden of demonstrating that she quit for good cause or valid circumstances within the meaning of *Maryland Annotated, Labor & Employment Article, § 8-1001*. The decision shall be reversed for the reasons stated herein.

DECISION

It is held that the unemployment of the claimant was due to leaving work voluntarily, without good cause or valid circumstances, within the meaning of Maryland Code Annotated, Labor and Employment Article, Title 8, Section 1001. The claimant is disqualified from receiving benefits from the week beginning April 21, 2013 and until the claimant becomes re-employed, earns at least fifteen times their weekly benefit amount and thereafter becomes unemployed through no fault of their own.

The Hearing Examiner's decision is reversed.



Eileen M. Rehrmann, Associate Member



Donna Watts-Lamont, Chairperson

VD

Copies mailed to:

TAMARA C. PIERCE

GOOD N CLEAN LLC

Susan Bass, Office of the Assistant Secretary

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS DECISION

TAMARA C PIERCE

SSN #

Claimant

vs.

GOOD N CLEAN LLC

Employer/Agency

Before the:

**Maryland Department of Labor,
Licensing and Regulation**

Division of Appeals

1100 North Eutaw Street

Room 511

Baltimore, MD 21201

(410) 767-2421

Appeal Number: 1315997

Appellant: Claimant

Local Office : 63 / CUMBERLAND

CLAIM CENTER

June 26, 2013

For the Claimant: PRESENT

For the Employer: PRESENT, NANCY L. NOTESTINE

For the Agency:

ISSUE(S)

Whether the claimant's separation from this employment was for a disqualifying reason within the meaning of the MD. Code Annotated, Labor and Employment Article, Title 8, Sections 1001 (Voluntary Quit for good cause), 1002 - 1002.1 (Gross/Aggravated Misconduct connected with the work), or 1003 (Misconduct connected with the work).

FINDINGS OF FACT

The claimant, Tamara C. Pierce, worked for Good N Clean, LLC on April 22, 2013. The claimant earned \$9.50 per hour while working part time as an office cleaner.

The claimant was interviewed for a part time job as an office cleaner at \$9.50 per hour on or about April 11, 2013. The claimant was told she would work two (2) nights a week, Mondays and Wednesdays, at a medical facility. She was given her start time and was told her ending time would be when she completed the work required. The claimant was sent a letter summarizing this information on the same day. The claimant's first day at work was April 22, 2013 and the Accounting Manager met her on site and gave her a

list of duties and showed her the facility. The claimant worked until 10:00 pm. This was not more or less than the amount of time other cleaners needed to clean the facility.

On April 23, 2013, the Accounting Manager called the claimant and asked how her first night was. The claimant said it was a lot more work than she expected and asked for more money per hour. The claimant further stated to the employer that it was no wonder that the former cleaner stole from the offices because she did not earn enough for the amount of work that was required. The employer told her that she would not be paid any more money and that the employer would find someone else to do the work. The employer offered to send her a check for her work on April 22, 2013 and the conversation ended. The employer mailed the claimant a check for her work that day.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Md. Code Ann., Labor & Emp. Article, Section 8-1002 provides that an individual shall be disqualified from receiving benefits where he or she is discharged or suspended from employment because of behavior which demonstrates gross misconduct. The statute defines gross misconduct as conduct that is a deliberate and willful disregard of standards that an employer has a right to expect and that shows a gross indifference to the employer's interests. Employment Sec. Bd. v. LeCates, 218 Md. 202, 145 A.2d 840 (1958); Painter v. Department of Emp. & Training, et al. 68 Md. App. 356, 511 A.2d 585 (1986); Department of Economic and Employment Dev. v. Hager, 96 Md. App. 362, 625 A.2d 342 (1993).

Md. Code, Ann., Labor & Emp. Article, Section 8-1002 provides that an individual shall be disqualified from receiving benefits when he or she was discharged or suspended from employment because of behavior that demonstrates gross misconduct. The statute defines gross misconduct as repeated violations of employment rules that prove a regular and wanton disregard of the employee's obligations.

Md. Code Ann., Labor & Emp. Article, Section 8-1003 provides for a disqualification from benefits where the claimant is discharged or suspended as a disciplinary measure for misconduct connected with the work. The term "misconduct" is undefined in the statute but has been defined as "...a transgression of some established rule or policy of the employer, the commission of a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, or a course of wrongful conduct committed by an employee, within the scope of his employment relationship, during hours of employment, or on the employer's premises." Rogers v. Radio Shack, 271 Md. 126, 132 (1974).

Md. Code Ann., Labor & Emp. Article, Section 8-1001 provides that an individual shall be disqualified for benefits where unemployment is due to leaving work voluntarily without good cause arising from or connected with the conditions of employment or actions of the employer, or without valid circumstances. A circumstance is valid only if it is (i) a substantial cause that is directly attributable to, arising from, or connected with conditions of employment or actions of the employing unit; or (ii) of such necessitous or compelling nature that the individual has no reasonable alternative other than leaving the employment.

The term "leaving work voluntarily" is not defined anywhere in Section 8-1001, and absent some imperative reason for enlarging its meaning, the term should be construed as having its ordinary and commonly accepted meaning. Allen v. CORE Target City Youth Program, 275 Md. 69, 338 A.2d 237 (1975).

The phrase "leaving work voluntarily" has a plain, definite, and sensible meaning, free of ambiguity. It expresses a clear legislative intent that to disqualify a claimant from benefits, the evidence must establish that the claimant, by his own choice, intentionally, of his own free will, terminated the employment. Allen v. CORE Target City Youth Program, 275 Md. 69, 338 A.2d 237 (1975).

EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE

The first determination that must be made in an unemployment hearing is whether the claimant quit or was discharged. That is, it must be decided who was the moving party to cause the separation. In the instant case, the claimant pressed the employer for more money. The employer became very concerned when the claimant stated that it was no wonder the former cleaning person stole from the offices she was assigned to clean. Thinking the claimant would be inclined to do the same, the employer told the claimant that someone else could be found to do the job. The employer was therefore the moving party causing the separation from employment.

In a discharge case the employer has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the credible evidence presented at the hearing that the discharge was for some form of misconduct, as that term is defined above. Ivey v. Catterton Printing Company, 441-BH-89. In the instant case, this burden has not been met.

The claimant sought to change the terms of employment by asking for more money and when the claimant alluded to a former employee stealing from the client, the employer decided to end the employment relationship. Asking for more money is not misconduct. No misconduct was therefore shown by the employer in its case.

I hold that the claimant did not commit a transgression of some established rule or policy of the employer, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, or engage in a course of wrongful conduct within the scope of the claimant's employment relationship, during hours of employment, or on the employer's premises. No unemployment disqualification shall be imposed based on Md. Code, Ann., Labor & Emp. Article, Section 8-1003 pursuant to this separation from this employment.

DECISION

IT IS HELD THAT the claimant was discharged, but not for misconduct connected with the work within the meaning of Md. Code Ann., Labor & Emp. Article, Section 8-1003. No disqualification is imposed based upon the claimant's separation from employment. The claimant is eligible for benefits so long as all other eligibility requirements are met. The claimant may contact Claimant Information Service concerning the other eligibility requirements of the law at ui@dllr.state.md.us or call 410-949-0022 from the Baltimore region, or 1-800-827-4839 from outside the Baltimore area. Deaf claimants with TTY may contact Client Information Service at 410-767-2727, or outside the Baltimore area at 1-800-827-4400.

The determination of the Claims Examiner is reversed.

B. Taylor

B. Taylor, Esq.
Hearing Examiner

Notice of Right to Request Waiver of Overpayment

The Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation may seek recovery of any overpayment received by the Claimant. Pursuant to Section 8-809 of the Labor and Employment Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland, and Code of Maryland Regulations 09.32.07.01 through 09.32.07.09, the Claimant has a right to request a waiver of recovery of this overpayment. This request may be made by contacting Overpayment Recoveries Unit at 410-767-2404. If this request is made, the Claimant is entitled to a hearing on this issue.

A request for waiver of recovery of overpayment does not act as an appeal of this decision.

Esto es un documento legal importante que decide si usted recibirá los beneficios del seguro del desempleo. Si usted disiente de lo que fue decidido, usted tiene un tiempo limitado a apelar esta decisión. Si usted no entiende cómo apelar, usted puede contactar (301) 313-8000 para una explicación.

Notice of Right of Further Appeal

This is a final decision. Any party may request a further appeal either in person, by facsimile or by mail with the Board of Appeals. Under COMAR 09.32.06.01A(1) appeals may not be filed by e-mail. Your appeal must be filed by July 11, 2013. You may file your request for further appeal in person at or by mail to the following address:

Board of Appeals
1100 North Eutaw Street
Room 515
Baltimore, Maryland 21201
Fax 410-767-2787
Phone 410-767-2781

NOTE: Appeals filed by mail are considered timely on the date of the U.S. Postal Service postmark.

Date of hearing: June 20, 2013

DAH/Specialist ID: WCU53

Seq No: 002

Copies mailed on June 26, 2013 to:

TAMARA C. PIERCE
GOOD N CLEAN LLC
LOCAL OFFICE #63